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Abstract: The international protest surrounding the Copenhagen Zoo’s 
recent decision to kill a healthy giraffe in the name of population man-
agement reveals a deep moral tension between contemporary zoological 
display practices—which induce zoo-goers to view certain animals as in-
dividuals, quasi-persons, or friends—and the traditional objectives of zoos, 
which ask us only to view animals as specimens. I argue that these zoo-
logical display practices give rise to moral obligations on the part of zoos 
to their visitors, and thus ground indirect duties on behalf of zoos to their 
animals. I conclude that zoos might take on interspecies friendship as a new 
zoological objective.
1. InTroDucTIon
On February 9th, 2014, Marius, a healthy two-year-old reticulated giraffe, was killed1 by a shot to the head by his handlers at the Copenhagen Zoo, 
then publicly autopsied, skinned, and fed to the zoo’s lions. Despite interna-
tional protest and offers from other zoos to adopt Marius, the zoo officials, act-
ing in accordance with the European Association of Zoos and Aquaria (EAZA)’s 
breeding program policy, chose to kill him because he was “surplus.” Having 
reached mating age, and because his genes were too similar to those of the 
other giraffes in the EAZA’s breeding program, it was deemed undesirable for 
him to mate, and inhumane for him to be sterilized—which is the practice 
1.  
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in North American zoos in analogous situations—because it would cruelly 
frustrate his natural mating behavior.
The zoo officials justified the posthumous public exhibitions as scientific 
and educational: the autopsy would provide educational, scientific, informa-
tion about giraffe anatomy and physiology, and, since giraffes would be eaten 
by carnivorous predators in the wild, public viewing of the feeding would pro-
vide a unique educational opportunity as well. The justifications for Marius’s 
fate thus referenced three of the four main objectives of modern zoos: educa-
tion, science, and conservation.2 Not in need of conservation (reticulated gi-
raffes are not endangered in the wild, and the zoo population was at what the 
officials deemed to be “capacity”) he ought to be killed; his corpse, publicly 
autopsied and used as meat, would then satisfy the scientific and educational 
objectives of the zoo.
The international outrage and extensive media coverage surrounding 
these events—including some 27,000 signatures on an online petition to spare 
Marius from death,3 and more than 155,000 signatures on a still active peti-
tion to the Prime Minister of Denmark to close the zoo after Marius’s death 
had taken place4—suggest that not only were the zoo’s proffered justifications 
for Marius’s fate insufficient, but that there was something especially morally 
wrong with this case, over and above the insufficiency of the zoo’s justifica-
tions. After all, there are many instances where zoos are vulnerable to critique 
about meeting their stated objectives, or about whether their stated objectives 
are indeed worth meeting, and yet these instances and their moral import are 
rarely debated, let alone emphatically objected to, by the public at large or by 
mainstream media outlets. But was there in fact something especially morally 
wrong with what happened to Marius? And if there was, what, exactly, was it? 
I will attempt to answer these questions in what follows.
The suspicion that there was something especially wrong with this case 
is further heightened by the fact that though some three to five thousand 
animals are killed for these same reasons every year in European zoos—includ-
ing approximately two hundred large animals5—we do not normally see any 
2. These three objectives—and the fourth, recreation—are ubiquitous in zoo mission 
statements, as well as in the missions of umbrella zoo accrediting associations, such as 
World Association of Zoos and Aquariums.
3. The Guardian. “Marius the Giraffe Killed at Copenhagen Zoo Despite Worldwide 
Protests.” Accessed October 19, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
feb/09/marius-giraffe-killed-copenhagen-zoo-protests
4. The Petition Site. “Close Zoos That Slaughter Healthy Animals.” Accessed Octo-
ber 19, 2014. http://www.thepetitionsite.com/923/331/674/marius-the-giraffe-slaugh-
tered-boycott-close-down-copenhagen-zoo/
5. The BBC. Accessed October 19, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/maga-
zine-26356099 
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kind of public protest of these animals’ deaths, let alone protest on this scale. 
Though I believe that all of these killings are at least prima facie moral wrongs, 
I will not attempt to defend that view here. Here I want to argue that Marius’s 
case presented a moral wrong over and above the moral wrong of killing a 
healthy captive animal, and that even if the killing of healthy captive animals 
is not morally problematic per se, there is nevertheless a moral problem with 
this particular case.
I will argue that when we enquire more deeply into the reasons some of 
us objected to Marius’s case, we find that perhaps the protests were caused 
by our having come to view Marius as in some way ‘special’—which in what 
follows, I will use this term as an umbrella concept to capture either his being 
viewed as a unique individual, as a quasi-person, or, for some of us, even as a 
friend. For some viewers, Marius and other special animals might be seen as 
all three, or as some combination of them, though I believe that any one of 
them is sufficient to ground specialness. These viewing postures were adopted 
at the zoo’s urging, through its broadly anthropomorphic display practices 
which conveyed messages of specialness in the first two years of Marius’s life. 
In other words, the zoo had assured the zoo-going public, by means of its dis-
play practices, that it would treat Marius as special, whereas the manner and 
justification for his killing reneged on that assurance and, in an about-face, 
instead referenced three of the four zoological objectives, which treated him 
quite otherwise, as a mere specimen; that is, as a part typical of a class.
While the discrepancy and dissonance between treatment as special, and 
treatment as a mere specimen, is psychologically unnerving, to be sure, it does 
not obviously generate a significant moral wrong. I will argue that the zoo 
generates moral obligations owed to the viewing public through the assur-
ances made in its display practices, and those obligations, I will argue, are 
neither negated nor outweighed by the merits of fulfilling the zoo’s objectives. 
Thus, the protests grasped, on some level, this moral wrong, and were not 
based on mere sentimentality. I will show that Marius’s case reveals a tension 
between modern zoological display practices and modern zoological objec-
tives, and argue that this tension morally ought to be resolved in favor of the 
display practices, rather than in favor of the zoological objectives. Thus while 
Marius’s killing in one way represents a unique moral wrong, many of my 
concerns are more broadly applicable to the treatment of special animals in 
zoos worldwide, to the anthropomorphizing zoological display practices that 
enact these animals as special, and to the moral obligations these practices 
entail to viewers generally.
The particular moral wrong committed in Marius’s case arises from his 
characterization as special by virtue of the zoo’s display practices. These prac-
tices and that characterization in turn constitute an implicit assurance to con-
tinue to treat Marius as special. This, notably, is a wrong as against us, the 
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zoo-going public, rather than a wrong against Marius himself: Marius did not 
know that he had been treated as special by the zoo’s display practices, and 
thus had no reason to believe he would receive special treatment. In other 
words, the zoo did not make an implicit promise to Marius to treat him as 
special; they made that promise to us. Therefore, the particular moral wrong 
committed by the Copenhagen Zoo was not a wrong against Marius, to whom 
the promise was not made, but to the zoo going public, to whom it was. The 
zoo might very well have other obligations to Marius—to meet his basic needs 
and to protect him from harm, for instance—and their actions may very well 
have violated those as well. But if zoos have these latter obligations, then they 
have them for all of their animals, including the other three to five thousand 
killed due to their having been deemed ‘surplus,’ and my chief concern in this 
paper is identifying and analyzing what, if anything, is particularly morally 
wrong with this particularly disturbing case.
Before moving on, I want to quickly discuss two objections to my argu-
ment. The first is whether the bare fact that Marius was being put to death is 
what made him special, rather than the zoological display practices that he 
was subjected to throughout his life. No doubt his killing, and the public an-
ticipation of it, had an impact, and a significant one at that, on the depth and 
breadth of the concern about him. However, my argument holds that zoo-
goers are already predisposed to care about certain animals, those held out 
as special because of broadly anthropomorphizing display practices. On my 
view, special zoo animals enter our moral sphere because of those practices, 
and then when a particular instance of cruelty, such as killing or mistreat-
ment, comes to light, we are justifiably outraged. Thus, the display practices 
of zoos per se initiate the entry of special animals into our moral sphere and, 
by virtue of being in it, elicit a baseline level of concern. Following upon that, 
when conditions arise which then violate their status as subjects of our moral 
concern, we justifiably raise our baseline level of concern to whatever degree 
the morally problematic conditions warrant, much as we would any other 
being in our moral sphere, human or non-human.
A second objection to my view arises from the idea that Marius’s death 
and the posthumous displays do not in fact constitute a special moral wrong, 
given their ubiquity in European zoos. Why, for example, might it be per-
missible for the zoo to feed the lions a deer carcass or feed snakes live mice, 
for examples, but not feed the lions Marius? My argument in what follows 
applies only to a certain class of animals in the zoo—those who are displayed 
as special. Thus the killing and/or the use of non-special animals as food for 
other animals may or may not be of moral concern generally, but it is not the 
subject of the particular kind of moral concern with which I am here occu-
pied: the violation of a particular relationship with moral entailments to the 
the zoo-goer that the zoo inspires by holding particular animals out as special.
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2. WhAT Do ZooS Do?
Before moving on to defending the above ideas, let me first clarify a few key 
terms and premises, and respond to some potential challenges which which 
they may meet. The idea of specialness is a concept which is meant to encap-
sulate a variety of related ideas, all of which are inspired, or perhaps, more 
strongly, induced, by contemporary zoological display practices: first, an ani-
mal may be special by virtue of being displayed as an individual, by which I 
mean having a unique back story of how it got to the zoo, a unique person-
ality, set of dispositions, or unusual physical markings, which may or may 
not be put in anthropomorphic terms by the zoo. However, display as an 
individual need not be anthropomorphic per se to generate a sense in the 
viewer that she is not viewing a zebra, say, but rather this one. We will find 
that this idea of the singularity of special animals runs throughout the concept 
of specialness, in all its presentations, and, indeed, it is at the core of what I 
take to be the morally problematic disjunction between the animal as singular 
by virtue of the display practices that hold it out as such, and the animal as a 
specimen, the very opposite of singularity, that satisfies zoological objectives.
An animal may also be held out as special by virtue of being displayed as 
a ‘quasi-person,’ which I will argue results from the zoo’s having anthropo-
morphized certain charismatic animals by naming them, especially by giving 
them proper names and celebrating their birthdays—again, establishing the 
animal as singular—as I discuss more fully in the next section. The zoo-goer is 
thus induced to form certain expectations by virtue of this anthropomorphiz-
ing, as follows: if an anthropomorphized animal is, by definition, thought 
of as like a human person,6 and human persons are thought of as being owed 
at least prima facie respectful treatment, it follows that the zoo-goers are jus-
tified in their expectations that the zoo animals that the zoo holds out as 
‘quasi-persons’ are likewise, by analogy, owed prima facie respectful treatment. 
Chief among the expectations such respectful treatment in turn gives rise to is 
the expectation not to be killed. Whether or not Marius or other charismatic 
animals are in fact persons, rather than ‘quasi-persons’ is a question about 
which I intend here to remain neutral; for my purposes, I need only make the 
more modest claim that the animals the zoo holds out as quasi-persons, a status 
they have achieved by virtue of the zoo’s having anthropomorphized them, 
6. This definition is more general, but in no way in conflict with, the definitions of an-
thropomorphism offered by such authors as Serpell (2003), de Waal (1999), and Horow-
itz and Bekoff (2007). These authors enumerate specific human qualities attributed to 
animals such as beliefs and emotions, but my definition emphasizes the idea that an-
thropomorphizing is, at its most basic level, an activity of analogizing between human 
and non-human animals.
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constitutes an assurance to the viewer—by virtue of the analogy created by 
anthropomorphizing—that the zoo will continue to treat them as such.
Thus, even if Marius is not in fact a person, not having met some philo-
sophical criteria for personhood (let alone some legal criteria) and thus is not 
directly owed respectful treatment by the zoo on those grounds, zoo-goers, 
having been assured that Marius was special (individual, quasi-person, friend) 
and thus deserving of respectful treatment on those grounds, are nevertheless 
entitled to have this assurance kept. My construal of ‘quasi-personhood’ as 
established in the anthropomorphizing practices of zoos is, notably, less strin-
gent than the dominant philosophical accounts of personhood proper.7 The 
fact that my argument relies on acceptance of the premise that zoo-goers tend 
to view some zoo animals as quasi-persons, rather than any claim that they 
are persons, makes it preferable to arguments which attempt to ground the 
moral status of animals in their actual possession of personhood. This is not 
only because the standard accounts of personhood in the philosophical litera-
ture (of possessing a level of self-consciousness sufficient to value one’s own 
life) or in the legal literature (requiring a legal person to bear both rights and 
corollary duties) is likely too high for most animals to meet, but also because 
even if we attempted to apply a less rigorous definition of personhood to zoo 
animals directly, we remain vexed with thorny and perennial empirical and 
epistemological questions regarding how to establish whether, and in virtue 
of what evidence, a particular animal may be said to have passed a particular 
bar sufficient to establish personhood.
My account can sidestep all of these issues through its claim that inten-
tionally generating quasi-personhood status by virtue of the analogical think-
ing that anthropomorphic display practices entails is sufficient to ground 
moral obligations, admittedly not to the animal herself, but rather to zoo-
goers. This is important because if my argument is sound, it provides a way 
to ground moral obligations owed by zoos to their attendees, and thus may 
provide a route toward indirect duties to animals regardless of their status as 
persons—through the obligations owed by the zoo to its patrons—that the 
animals may not otherwise have had directly.
Finally, a third way for an animal to be ‘special’ is to be regarded as a 
friend or, even a quasi-family member, by zoo-goers. The kind of friendship 
or family member I am envisioning here is akin to the sense in which com-
panion animals are seen as friends or family members by their human com-
panions. Of course, the parallels are inexact: there is a level of reciprocity in a 
human-companion animal relationship that is not achieved in the zoo-goer–
zoo-animal relationship, in that while the zoo-goer might very much feel as 
if she is participating in the zoo animal’s life, it is doubtful that a zoo animal 
7. See, for instance, Tooley 2011.
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feels a part of the zoo-goer’s life. But in any case, much as children may be led 
to think of a dog as a member of the family, so zoo-goers may be led to think 
of certain zoo animals as members of the ‘zoo family’ or ‘zoo community.’ It 
is wrong to intentionally encourage such expectations, even if dogs are not 
members of the family and giraffes are not members of the zoo family, just as 
it would be wrong to encourage someone to think of you as a friend and then 
abruptly begin to treat them like a stranger.
Philosophical accounts of friendship differ, of course, but a key feature of 
friendship, again, is its singularity, the very notion that unites the umbrella 
concept of specialness. Lisa Guenther, in discussing a Levinasian take on 
friendship and animals, offers a general definition of friendship that is ap-
posite here:
a friend is someone whose company I enjoy, someone with whom I like 
to spend time. . . . I like my friend not because she possesses this or that 
specific quality, but rather because she is she and I am I. We like each 
other in our singularity, and we would not want to replace one friend 
with another simply because they share similar characteristics. (Guenther 
2007, 219)
And indeed we cannot replace one friend with another, human or non-human. 
Certainly anyone who has lost either a human or an animal friend and makes 
a new one later knows that in no sense is the new one ‘replacing’ the old one. 
Such an idea is indeed offensive, and that offensiveness goes to what I am 
here speaking about in the case of Marius. As an individual, as a quasi-person, 
as a friend, he was singular and irreplaceable. His death and the manner of 
it treated him as the very opposite: as a specimen, and thus, by definition, 
replaceable.
I maintain that the zoo, through its display practices, encourages certain 
animals to be seen as special, and encourages human-animal relationships to 
be formed on the basis of that specialness, and in so doing generates moral 
obligations. There may very well be differing degrees of obligation depending 
on what kind or degree of specialness the zoo encourages. I suspect that these 
three components of specialness—as individual, quasi-person, or friend—may 
form a continuum of ascending degrees of obligation, but I will not articulate 
that in any detail here. All that I maintain here is that intentionally causing 
zoo-goers to take up an animal on any point along the continuum is sufficient 
to generate obligations on behalf of zoos to zoo-goers.
It may be objected that my argument makes too much of zoo-goers’ experi-
ence when they view zoo animals. Some zoo-goers might not form an opinion 
on an animal’s specialness, others might form the explicit view that zoo ani-
mals are not special, still others—perhaps the majority of others—might have 
very vague, semi-conscious, or otherwise not well formulated beliefs about the 
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animals they are seeing. Certainly, very few people will form a friendship with 
the animal. Thus, the objection may run, my argument trades on what is in 
fact problematic vagueness in people’s beliefs about zoo animals’ statuses. But 
while it is doubtless true that some zoo-goers have no such beliefs, contrary 
beliefs, or only vague beliefs, this does not present a problem, for my argu-
ment only requires that some zoo-goers—and, indeed, there is evidence by 
the outrage in Marius’s case, as well as other evidence I present in Section 4, 
that many zoo-goers—believe that some zoo animals are individuals, quasi-
persons, or friends.
A second objection might run as follows: the claim that modern zoos 
display animals as special and thereby induce viewers to view them as such 
is at odds with an influential reading of the role of zoos historically as well as 
in the present. Famously, the precursor to zoos has been the royal menagerie, 
wherein a monarch kept a private display of animals that demonstrated his 
conquests abroad to his constituents at home. The more species, the better, 
in a royal menagerie, as evidence of the scope of a monarch’s dominion. The 
animals stood then as trophies of imperial force in distant lands.
Contemporary commentators, such as Malamud (1998), argue that zoos 
continue to serve this function into the present day, reasserting our colonial 
past, exemplifying our removal from nature, and expressing our feelings of 
dominance over, and separation from, animals by keeping them in captivity. 
My claim that zoos today in large part attract their audiences by displaying 
animals as special would stand at odds with this reading of the meaning and 
function of zoos; one whom you have conquered, dominated, or see as a tro-
phy, you do not see as an individual, quasi-person, or friend. I believe that this 
reading of zoos as imperial projects in the present day is unpersuasive and that 
modern zoos are importantly disanalogous to their menagerie predecessors. 
This disanalogy can be seen in both contemporary display practices and objec-
tives, and the evidence for both display practices and objectives that I discuss 
in what follows makes clear that zoos are not today the colonial projects they 
once were.
In fact, zoos have not been colonial projects for some time, and the his-
tory of their evolution is important background for my central claim about 
contemporary display practices and objectives. Beginning with Louis XIV’s 
infamous private menagerie that became the celebrated public collection in 
Paris’s Jardin des Plantes after the French Revolution, zoos evolved from caged 
menageries to zoological parks, and cages were replaced by enclosed diora-
mas. Their objectives correspondingly changed from taxonomical to ecologi-
cal, focusing not on the number of species but rather on educating about the 
animal’s natural habitat. Then, beginning with Carl Hagenbeck’s renowned 
Animal Park in the suburbs of Hamburg, Germany in 1907, but not adopted 
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widely until the early 1980s, zoos transformed into their current iteration as 
centers of environmental conservation.
Display practices morphed from dioramas into the paradigm of “immer-
sion exhibits,” designed elaborately to mimic the ecosystem of a set of animals. 
Immersive display practices are the state of the art in zoos in North America 
and Europe, and reflect the change in zoo objectives from taxonomical, to 
ecological, to today’s idea of inculcating concern for environmental conserva-
tion amongst zoo-goers. Immersion exhibits offer a 360 degree experience of a 
habitat, usually featuring a ‘flagship’ animal in need of conservation as a cen-
terpiece. These exhibits are often quite extravagant; the Bronx Zoo’s “Congo 
Gorilla Forest”—a paradigmatic example of the immersive display form—is 
6.5 acres, contains representatives of 75 animal species, including 22 goril-
las, 15,000 plants of more than 400 species and ten miles of fabricated trees, 
made of epoxy, steel, and urethane.8 A New York Times article about immersion 
exhibits in contemporary zoos reports that:
[A]nimal experts say, a landscape immersion exhibit can be a transform-
ing experience. When visitors form an emotional connection with the 
animals, they also take home a larger conservation message, said Richard 
L. Lattis, the senior vice president and general director of living insti-
tutions for the Wildlife Conservation Society, which operates the Bronx 
Zoo. . . .  ‘Immersion exhibits are about people,’ he said. ‘We’re trying to 
get them to make that link not just to the animal but to where that ani-
mal lives and what we’re going to do to save that animal.’”9
So, immersion exhibits are designed to elicit an emotional response (a sense 
of connection to the animal) from the viewer, for the purpose of inducing 
a belief (that such animals’ habitats should be conserved). It is precisely the 
intentionality of these practices, or so I will argue in Section 5, that generate 
obligations on the part of zoos to zoo-goers.
Thus, zoos have changed their display practices in order to elicit concern 
on the part of zoo-goers for animal conservation. The conservation objective 
is furthered, zoos believe, when zoo-goers form a psychological bond with 
the animal. This belief is furthered in no small part by the emerging field of 
“conservation psychology,” which aims to scientifically study the nature of 
human relationships with the rest of the natural world, with a particular fo-
8. Rothfels 2002, 199.




cus on how to encourage conservation of the natural world.10 Zoo-goers who 
report a positive emotional response to an animal also report enhanced caring 
about animals and their conservation (Kellert 1996; Myers and Saunders 2002; 
Hayward and Rothenberg 2004; Myers, Saunders, and Birjulin 2004). This ob-
jective, and the display practices that further it, demonstrate that it would be 
mistaken to view contemporary zoos as colonial installations. Rather, zoos 
are inculcating values of quite a different sort, and it is the moral obligations 
imposed by this inculcation that I am attempting here to elaborate. Immersive 
display practices support my claim that zoos are places where certain animals 
are displayed as special. What is problematic is not displaying animals as spe-
cial, but rather that zoos do not recognize the ethical implications of the dis-
play practices themselves, nor do they recognize the fact that honoring these 
implications may be at odds with fulfilling zoological objectives.
I turn now to further defending the premise that zoological display prac-
tices induce viewers into forming beliefs that some zoo animals are special. 
After that, I will argue that at least some zoo-goers do in fact form such beliefs, 
and finally to discussing my conclusion: that such inducements ground obli-
gations on behalf of zoos to the zoo-goers. One such obligation is to keep up 
this presentation of the animal, and this obligation in turn grounds indirect 
duties to zoo animals that would that prohibit, amongst other things, killing 
healthy animals to manage populations, public autopsy, and public feeding 
to other animals. If my argument is sound, it explains not only the particular 
moral wrong done in Marius’s case, in virtue of his status as special, but also 
makes clear the more general moral obligations owed by zoos to zoo-goers, 
whatever else might be owed to zoo animals directly. Finally, I will offer some 
suggestions for resolving one important implication of this discussion—that 
morally significant tensions exist between the moral obligations generated by 
zoological display practices and the moral obligations generated by the tradi-
tional zoological objectives—and that these tensions ought to be resolved in 
favor of the display practices.
3. conTeMporAry ZooLoGIcAL DISpLAy prAcTIceS
My argument relies on the premise that modern zoological display practices—
including the attempts of immersive displays to inspire emotions which 
prime us to form the pro-conservation beliefs discussed above—hold out cer-
tain animals as special; in effect, certain display practices establish the animals 
as special in the eyes of the viewer. I will argue in this section that in addition 
to immersive exhibits, other display practices, such as the practice of naming 
10. According to the definition offered by the American Psychological Association. Ac-
cessed October 19, 2014. http://www.apadivisions.org/division-34/interests/conserva-
tion/
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certain zoo animals, together with a variety of interactive practices, including 
zoos’ use of social media, serve further to induce us to view certain animals 
as special.
First, Marius, like many other zoo animals, was a named animal, and the 
practice of naming conveys quasi-personhood. Indeed, many philosophers 
claim that the speech act of naming an animal performatively contributes to 
its actual elevation to the level of quasi-personhood. Cora Diamond’s remarks 
in “Eating Meat and Eating People” are apposite:
[T]here are some actions, like giving people names, that are part of the 
way we come to understand and indicate our recognition of what kind 
it is with which we are concerned. . . . A pet is not something to eat; it 
is given a name, is let into our houses, and may be spoken to in ways in 
which we do not normally speak to cows or squirrels. That is to say, it is 
given some part of the character of a person.11
Diamond’s radical, but I think correct, idea is that it is social practices that 
define the nature of the relationship in question, rather than the other way 
around. Analogously, the very social nature of the display practices of zoos—
including the practice of naming—cause us to view certain animals as special, 
just as Diamond shows that certain social practices cause us to view certain 
animals as pets. Just as Diamond argues with pets, I want to maintain that the 
social practice of naming charismatic animals, and the social relations invited 
and organized by zoos, including, often, the social practice of mourning a 
deceased zoo animal, as I will discuss in Section 4, enacts the kind of meaning 
that animal has to us, and that meaning has moral import and consequences.
Most people think of their pets as special, and most people name their 
pets. Conversely, farm animals raised for meat are not typically named, nor 
are lab animals the experimenter intends to kill—again, I would argue, because 
in these cases we do not see them as special. Indeed, we often refrain from 
naming them in these cases in order that we do not run the risk of coming to 
see them as such. Farm animals used for dairy production, or animals whom 
are the subjects of long-term lab experiments might very well be named, and 
might very well be viewed as special by the humans close to them.
Leonard Lawlor, following Derrida, discusses the import of naming with 
respect to singularity:
Like a date, a name is a marker for a singularity. It replaces animals, a 
name in the place of the animals. But the name must also imply that 
the animal is singular, even absolutely or purely singular, a singularity 
for which there can be no substitute. We would compromise with the 
singularity of the animals . . . if the naming of them, if the names for 
11. Diamond 2005, 97. 
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them were only universal, were only general nouns. We would have only 
sacrifice and substitution, if we only ever spoke of the animal in general. 
(Lawlor 2007, 103)
Singularity, conveyed by naming particular animals with particular names, 
rather than just a name for the species, like ‘zebra’ or ‘giraffe,’ implies unique-
ness and irreplacability, and that implication, reasonably adopted by zoo-
goers, was violated in Marius’s case, when his death and the manner of it 
conveyed his utter replicability. Indeed, qua ‘surplus’ the Copenhagen zoo 
was saying, even more strongly, that he was ‘over-replicated.’
Lawlor goes even further, to say that “we must name all the animals 
with proper names, eliding all the definite articles. Unconditionally, we must 
name properly each and every one of the them” (Lawlor 2007, 103–04). But 
of course, we do not. Zoos name only certain of them—those who they hold 
out as special—and that makes the practice even more salient to zoo-goers, 
and more morally consequential. Indeed, the Derridean idea12 of at least call-
ing animals by definite articles—‘the giraffe,’ rather than ‘a giraffe’ to which 
Lawlor refers, and about which he insists upon going further, sheds more light 
on the uniqueness of Marius’s case.
Further support for the hypothesis that naming—even more so than the 
practice of using definite articles to refer to animals—leads to the attribution 
of specialness comes from the disparity in media coverage, and the disparity 
in public outrage, when, a mere seven weeks later, on March 25th, 2014, four 
lions—two adults and their two cubs—were also killed (though, importantly, 
not publicly autopsied or used as meat) by the Copenhagen Zoo to ‘make 
room’ for a new lion who would likely have killed the cubs. The animals 
were referred to quite simply in the media coverage as “the lions.” The dis-
parity in reporting between Marius and ‘the lions’ is striking: a search of the 
Factiva database—a compendious international database of print and online 
journalism—for ‘Copenhagen or Denmark’ and ‘giraffe’ from the dates Febru-
ary 9th through 23rd yielded over 950 results from both print and online 
media sources. A search for the terms ‘lions’ and ‘Copenhagen or Denmark’ 
from the dates March 21st to April 5th yielded 319 results: a 3 to 1 difference 
in coverage.
I want to suggest that because these lions were not named in the zoo’s 
press releases or in the media reports, they were not understood as special by 
the public. This is the inverse of Marius’s case, whose name was used repeat-
edly in the media accounts, and who was thus, as a result, seen as special. 
Because the lions were not named—and were thus less likely deemed special—
their treatment as specimens was not seen as violating their special status, 
12. Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 399.
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and thus did not generate nearly as much controversy. Though I believe that 
their killing was morally wrong, I do not think it perpetrates the additional 
wrong committed in Marius’s case—the wrong arising from betraying assur-
ances made to zoo-goers. Thus, I want to conclude that the more a zoo treats 
an animal as special through its display practices, such as naming, the greater 
the moral obligation it generates not to violate that animal’s status in fulfill-
ing its objectives, be they scientific, conservational, educational, or otherwise.
Naming animals not only contributes to quasi-personhood, but also to 
friendship, another key aspect of specialness. Lawlor, again following Der-
rida, lends further support to this idea that proper naming is requisite for 
friendship bonds to be formed. “This proper nomination is the only way for 
us to change our relation to them into one of friendship. As Derrida says in 
The Politics of Friendship, “the question of the proper name is obviously at 
the heart of the friendship problematic. . . . We have a real problem thinking 
friendship without the proper name.”13 (Lawlor 2007, 104). And indeed, as we 
have seen in cases of other charismatic animals with whom we form friend-
ship bonds, they too have proper names.
In addition to naming, there are a host of other practices that collabo-
rate to do more than establish animals as individuals or quasi-persons: these 
display practices encourage, if not induce, some zoo-goers to go on to form a 
friendship with the zoo animal. Other display practices such as celebrating the 
births and subsequent birthdays of zoo animals, naming them through public 
naming contests, having 24/7 webcams for popular animals, Facebook pages, 
twitter feeds, and blogs for and indeed “by” the animals (Knut, the celebrity 
German polar bear, “authored” a first person blog about his daily life), and 
zoo merchandise of particular celebrity animals are all commonplace social 
practices of contemporary zoos which encourage friendships to be formed, by 
inducing the feeling that zoo-goers are participating in some meaningful way 
(to the zoo-goer, at least) in the animal’s life.
The idea behind all of these varied practices is for zoo-goers to have in-
teractive experiences with certain animals, which, as I noted earlier, has been 
the goal of immersion exhibits generally. These interactive, unique, experi-
ences are carefully engineered to elicit emotional responses that will in turn 
elicit pro-conservation beliefs. Short of immersion exhibits, or in concert with 
them, there are many ways in which an exhibit can be interactive. Children’s 
petting zoos are paradigm examples, instilling these feelings at crucially early 
ages. The Hamill Family Play Zoo at the Brookfield Zoo in suburban Chicago 
is a paradigm of the form, and its website says of its host of interactive activi-
13. The quote is from Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 251.
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ties that: “The goal is to foster in kids a connection with nature as they have 
fun.”14
Many celebrity animals, such as Knut, were well-known in part because of 
the way they interacted with zoo-goers. Visitors to Knut’s enclosure reported 
that he “played with them” by tossing the ball into his moat and inviting 
zoo-goers to play catch.15 One phenomenological account of zoos documents 
other, similar, interactive experiences recalled by visitors: “‘I remember when 
Babe the ox licked me with her big, strong sandpaper tongue,’ . . . ‘I remember 
how much I used to love going to Wolf Woods in order to sit and watch the 
wolves. . . . For some reason I felt like I was a part of their pack.’”16 Such ex-
periences would no doubt incline viewers to see the animals with whom they 
interacted as special.
Other display practices that induce emotional responses in the service of 
inculcating pro-conservation beliefs often take place outside of the zoo, on 
social media. For example, a quick survey of the Twitter accounts of some 
major zoos in Europe and the United States in the fall of 2014 yields such 
results as the Minnesota Zoo’s report that: “Breakfast . . . check! Now Tango 
says it’s time to enjoy this beautiful Friday!”17 Tango is a baby sloth. A photo 
of Tango eating her breakfast is attached to the post. Though the post is in the 
third person, the tweet nevertheless puts human sentiments into the mouths 
of animals, and these sentiments express the animal’s unique personality: in 
this case, Tango is held out to the public as having a laid back, carefree, per-
sonality.
The Cleveland Zoo reminds us that time is running out to participate 
in their giraffe feedings: “Come out and feed Jhasmin, Jada, Grace or Travis 
today!”18 Not only are these animals proper named, but involving the public 
in their feeding contributes to the sense that we know these animals person-
ally, and are active participants in their lives. Of course, the very fact that 
these zoo Twitter accounts have followers is strong evidence that some frac-
tion of zoo-goers are engaging in these relationships with the animals, though 
of course it is difficult in a medium like Twitter to discern with what degree of 
seriousness the public does so.
The San Francisco Zoo posts a caption of two otters close enough so that 
one appears to be whispering in the other’s ear. The caption reads: “Dude, be 
14. The Chicago Zoological Society. Accessed October 19, 2014. http://www.czs.org/
CZS/playzoo
15. David Crossland “Farewell Knut, Thanks for the Memories,” Der Spiegel, March 21, 
2011. 
16. Garrett 2014, 86.
17. @mnzoo, September 26, 2014.
18. @clemetzoo, September 28, 2014.
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cool. I know where they hide the fish.”19 Of course, no one believes that the 
otters are actually talking, but the idea is certainly to invest them with person-
ality, which is to say, to individuate them. The St. Louis Zoo posts a picture of 
a sea lion balancing a St. Louis Cardinals embossed baseball on her nose, and 
states that: “Roby the #sealion lives for #RedOctober. Let’s go @Cardinals!!”20 
Again, the animal is named and the tweet expresses the animal’s individual 
anthropomorphic dispositions towards baseball. The National Zoo advises 
that: “Elephant Bozie is fighting an infection, but it takes more than a spoon-
ful of sugar to help the medicine go down” and attaches a YouTube video of 
her medicine being administered.21 Not only is this animal named, but she 
also has a personal plight of illness, likely to elicit an emotional response. 
This canvassing of contemporary display practices clearly establishes my first 
premise: that zoological display practices attempt to induce zoo-goers to view 
the animal as special. I will now move on to defend my second premise: that 
such attempts work, at least in many cases.
4. our Zoo AnIMAL FrIenDS
If Twitter is a difficult medium through which to discern the depth of pub-
lic buy-in to the idea that some zoo animals are individuals or persons, and 
indeed in some cases, friends, we can learn a lot, on the other hand, from 
comment threads in other online media which allow for more sustained 
commentary from the public. An excellent example of such a venue was the 
blog “written” by Knut (2006–2011), the celebrity polar bear at the Berlin 
zoo. While this blog was not initiated by the Berlin zoo directly, but rather 
by a local broadcasting company whose sponsorship agreement with the zoo 
granted it exclusive access to Knut before he began his public life,22 the vol-
ume of comments in the blog reveal a great deal about the degree to which 
zoo-goers came to view Knut as special by engaging with him at all. The blog 
was extremely popular internationally, attracting nearly fifty thousand hits 
daily, and generating between two and eight hundred comments per post. 
When we examine the content of the comments, we see that fans addressed 
Knut directly, which was apt because the blog was written in the first person, 
itself a conceit apt to induce the belief in Knut’s specialness.
Knut’s death met with a great deal of public outpouring of grief. One 
report observed that:
19. @sfzoo, October 4, 2014.
20. @stlzoo, October 3, 2014.
21. @NationalZoo, October 3, 2014.
22. As noted in Flinterud 2013. 
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people grieved online as if they had lost a member of their family. It is 
common practice in zoos that when famous or large animals die that 
they are often turned over to local museums of natural history to join 
their taxidermy collections. The thought of this being done to the “be-
loved” Knut caused outrage and protest. . . . Nearly 10,000 people signed 
an online protest against Knut’s display in the Natural History Museum. 
(Garrett 2014, 4)
These examples of intense emotions at a beloved zoo animal’s death go a long 
way to establishing that many of us feel personally connected to a particular 
zoo animal, and feel a sense of personal loss and grief when that animal dies. 
The point about Knut’s remains establishes that even seemingly respectful 
posthumous displays of a beloved animal are controversial, and thus the reac-
tion to Marius’s disposal comes as less of a surprise.
Heidi, the celebrity cross-eyed opossum at the Leipzig Zoo in Germany, 
has a still-active Facebook page, in spite of her death in 2011. Of course, hav-
ing crossed eyes was a unique individual feature, demarcating her from a typi-
cal opossum specimen. When the zoo announced her death, via the page, the 
post drew more than 5,000 comments of condolence. The numbers, and the 
expressions of emotion for Heidi personally, provide strong evidence that the 
effort by zoos to display certain animals as special are effective: we do indeed 
come to see these animals as such.
Jalopy, the Galapagos Tortoise at the Staten Island Zoo, was a celebrity 
even prior to the advent of the Internet. He died in 1983, but his long battle 
with cancer, followed by his untimely (by tortoise standards) death at approxi-
mately 75 years of age, drew an extraordinary amount of sympathy from the 
public. When Jalopy’s movement was impeded by the cancer, he was taped to 
a makeshift skateboard to get around his enclosure. This endeared him to zoo-
goers and again served to individuate, personify, and induce zoo-goers to feel 
he was special. When Jalopy returned to the zoo after cancer treatment in Ari-
zona, his transport from the airport to the zoo was accompanied by a ticker-
tape parade, culminating with over one hundred people waiting for him at 
his enclosure.23 “‘Jalopy was a presence at the Zoo for 46 years,’ said Kenneth 
Mitchell, the zoo’s interim executive director. ‘People not only grew up with 
Jalopy—they were able to have a shared experience with their children. Her 
story was told internationally when she could no longer walk. . . . Her battle 
with cancer not only brought care and concern, but made Jalopy a hopeful 
23. The Observer-Reporter. “Tumorous Turtle Toast of Staten Island Zoo.” Accessed Oc-
tober 19, 2014. http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2519&dat=19830909&id=kX
1iAAAAIBAJ&sjid=cHcNAAAAIBAJ&pg=2693,1058318
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symbol for those faced with adversity.’”24 Jalopy’s New York Times obituary 
noted that: “William Summerville, the zoo’s curator, said news of Jalopy’s ill-
ness had drawn hundreds of letters from children all over the country. ‘He was 
a very personable sort of fellow,’ Mr. Summerville said, ‘and people tended to 
identify with him.’”25 These quotes provide strong evidence that zoo-goers, in 
appreciable numbers, viewed Jalopy as special.
In discussing his own motivations for writing a phenomenological ac-
count of zoo-going, Erik A. Garrett discusses his childhood feelings about 
zoos, which are apposite: “As a shy child it was a place where my ‘friends’ 
lived. It was a place where I developed and first understood empathetic think-
ing, often wondering about the internal life of the animals around me.”26 Gar-
rett was one of those zoo-goers who went further than viewing the animals 
as individuals or persons; he saw some of them as friends. He writes of his 
childhood zoo experiences: “I remember that my favorite animal was Olga 
the walrus. I used to love to see her ‘show’ on the south side of the zoo. Olga 
would blow kisses to the crowd and spray water at the children at the prompt-
ing of the keepers. I distinctly remember the sadness when she died in 1988. 
. . . It was as if a close friend or family member had just passed away.”27
Garrett later worked at the Brookfield Zoo, and undertook a phenomeno-
logical study of the experiences people have at zoos. He identified seven main 
motivations for zoo visits, one of which, importantly, was ‘caring’ about the 
animals.28 As we have seen, this emotive response is greatly valued by zoos, 
who are attempting to inculcate just that feeling in their patrons in order 
to inspire pro-conservation beliefs. This array of evidence, from online com-
mentary by zoo-goers, to outpourings of support for particular animals, to 
deep grief at their passing, establishes my second premise: that appreciable 
numbers of zoo-goers do indeed view some zoo animals as special.
5. The MorAL TenSIon BeTWeen DISpLAy prAcTIceS AnD 
ZooLoGIcAL oBjecTIveS
We have seen that zoological display practices hold some animals out as 
special, and that some zoo-goers indeed take them up as such. In contrast, 
traditional zoological objectives can be satisfied by treating animals as mere 
24. SILIVE.com. Accessed October 19, 2014. http://www.silive.com/northshore/index.
ssf/2010/05/bronzed_and_beautiful.html
25. The New York Times. Accessed October 19, 2014. http://www.nytimes.
com/1983/12/09/nyregion/new-york-day-by-day-100261.html




specimens. Thus, once an animal becomes special, that status, as we saw in 
Marius’s case, becomes potentially in tension with the stated objectives of 
zoos. For instance, as we have seen, the decision to kill Marius was made in 
the name of conservation, and the disposal of his body was made in the name 
of science and education—all of which only require understanding him as a 
specimen, and indeed are incompatible with understanding him as special. 
The zoo’s decisions sparked the outrage they did because Marius had earlier 
been established by the zoo as special—that is, as the very opposite of a mere 
specimen—by virtue of the zoo’s display practices. The moral wrong causing 
the unprecedented outrage in this case, then, was based on the zoo’s confla-
tion of the two statuses, and the betrayal of what was, in effect, an assurance 
made to the zoo-going public—that once an animal is held out as special, that 
animal will continue to be treated as such, and thereby afforded the right to 
life and respect afforded to any person.
It may be objected that the zoo’s assurances did not generate any moral 
obligations, either because of their implicitness, or because people did not 
rely on them, or because people unreasonably believed that the animal was 
special, or unreasonably believed that specialness at one time implies special-
ness for the duration of the animal’s life. I think that none of these statements 
are true, and that the zoo’s implicit, and misleading, assurances in displaying 
Marius as special gave rise to moral obligations. It should be noted that on any 
background moral theory, the act of intentionally misleading, which the zoo 
clearly did, is taken to be a prima facie moral wrong. Accordingly, there are as 
many ways to ground what is wrong with misleading assurances as there are 
background moral theories, but, for illustrative purposes, one helpful example 
is Scanlon’s contractualist discussion of the moral obligations arising from 
creating expectations about one’s behavior.
Two of Scanlon’s principles might capture very well the zoo’s wrongdoing 
with respect to its assurances. Scanlon’s Principle of Due Care states that “One 
must exercise due care not to lead others to form reasonable but false expecta-
tions about what one will do when one has good reason to believe that they 
would suffer significant loss as a result of relying on those expectations.”29 
Scanlon’s Principle of Loss Prevention may also cover the wrong done by the 
zoo: “If one has intentionally or negligently led someone to expect that one 
is going to follow a certain course of action, X, and one has good reason to 
believe that that person will suffer significant loss as a result of this expecta-
tion if one does not follow X, then one must take reasonable steps to prevent 
that loss.”30 If these principles are true—as they seem intuitively to be—then 
29. Scanlon 1998, 300.
30. Ibid., 301.
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we need only establish that the zoo-goers’ expectations were reasonable, that 
the zoo-goers suffered significant loss, and that this loss was foreseeable.
As to the zoo-goers’ expectations being reasonable, I think that the fact 
that when we treat humans—or paradigm special animals such as companion 
animals—as special, we do so for the duration of that being’s life, gives rise to 
the reasonable expectation that we will do likewise for zoo animals who are 
treated as analogously special. Evidence of some zoo-goers having suffered 
significant loss can be seen from the public grief over the other popular zoo 
animals referenced above, as well as the fact that so many people signed the 
petitions about Marius’s plight. That this loss should have been foreseeable 
by the zoo is clear from the evidence of other instances of celebrity animals’ 
deaths, as well as the fact that the international protest about Marius was 
well-known by the zoo in advance of his death, since its employees took to the 
media to defend the decision prior to killing him.
If all of this is correct, we may conclude that the zoo’s behavior in its 
display practices was intentionally misleading—it wanted a to create an emo-
tional connection between the animal and the visitor, in order to further its 
conservation goals. This behavior gave rise to obligations to continue to treat 
Marius as special, and the zoo then violated those obligations when it decided 
to kill him in the name of fulfilling zoological objectives. I will argue in the fi-
nal section that the zoological objectives were not compelling enough reasons 
to override these moral obligations.
Though one might object to the application of Scanlon’s principles in 
the Copenhagen case because the zoo informed the public beforehand that 
they intended to kill Marius, I would reply the only meaningful ‘beforehand’ 
would have been upon Marius’s birth, not in the weeks before his death, if the 
zoo was to avoid inducing anthropomorphizing analogical reasoning giving 
rise to moral obligations. Further, I intend Scanlon’s principles, and the criti-
cisms I’ve made of zoos generally, to be read broadly, as a commentary on the 
moral entailments of anthropomorphizing zoological display practices gener-
ally, not just with respect to the Copenhagen Zoo in particular.
Though, to be sure, some zoos go further than others in the degree to 
which they engage in anthropomorphizing practices, the ubiquity of these 
display practices is in itself a large part of the problem, especially in the In-
ternet age. Zoo-goers have the reasonable expectation that animals will be 
treated as special because of their experiences of zoos in general, not solely be-
cause of the Copenhagen Zoo. That is, we ‘import’ our other zoo experiences 
to this case and these experiences are likely to include zoos further along the 
anthropomorphizing spectrum. Indeed, since the overwhelming majority of 
signatories to the petitions to spare Marius were people whom had never met 
him in person—indeed, they came from all over the world—the presumption 
of specialness, and the expectation of respectful treatment that resulted from 
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it was due, at least in part, to expectations set by zoos writ large, particularly 
American zoos. That this is the case does not weigh against the responsibility 
of the Copenhagen Zoo for its treatment of Marius; rather, it increases the 
sense in which the suffering of zoo-goers was foreseeable.
Thus, the discomfort, for many, around Marius’s death and disposal 
revealed that zoological objectives exist uncomfortably—not only psycho-
logically, but morally—alongside a key feature of the display practices of 
contemporary zoos: the animal is displayed as special, rather than merely as 
a specimen of her species—as the fulfillment of zoological objectives would 
otherwise have it. The moral outrage—and, I maintain, the legitimate moral 
wrong—over and above the insufficiency of the zoo’s justifications arose be-
cause of the intuition that we ought not kill healthy individuals or quasi-
persons (let alone those who have become our friends!) nor ought we to use 
these special animals’ bodies for meat, or for science, at least not in such 
a spectacular—literally, as spectacle—way. While many of us may not have 
moral difficulty with the killing of animals simpliciter, many of us have the 
intuition that we ought not to kill our animal friends, and this, I submit was 
the feeling—indeed, the morally justified feeling—that made Marius’s case a 
unique moral wrong, over and above the moral wrong (not argued for here) 
of other zoo killings.
Put another way, perhaps the zoo’s justifications for the killing were held 
by many to be insufficient because they overlooked the singular level on 
which we came to feel as if we knew and valued Marius—and the moral ob-
ligations that such relationships give rise to—and reasoned only on the basis 
of the impersonal, specimen level addressed by the four traditional objectives. 
Marius’s case tragically illustrated the important moral tensions between the 
impersonal stated objectives of zoos, and the moral implications of their very 
personal display practices.
6. concLuSIon
How ought we to resolve these tensions? Since the four objectives have been 
persuasively critiqued by Jamieson (2006) and others, we ought not to resolve 
the tensions in favor of these objectives over the display practices. Almost 
no one supports the idea that animal captivity is justified by the objective of 
human recreation (although, interestingly, the research into what zoo-goers 
actually achieve during a zoo visit is just that [Turley 2001; Klenosky and 
Saunders 2008]); the empirical claim that zoos provide meaningful educa-
tional experiences or conduct important scientific research has been shown 
to be highly questionable—zoo-goers tend to ignore the educational displays 
about the animals, and any science would necessarily study the animal’s re-
sponses to captivity, rather than the animal’s ‘natural’ behavior.
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Further, the idea that zoos are ‘conserving’ animals for reintroduction into 
the wild is dubious, both because attempts thus far have had very limited suc-
cess, in part because endangered animals have no ‘wild’ to return to, as their 
endangerments have been caused by an erosion of their habitats. Further, in 
any case, the reticulated giraffe is not endangered, so these conservation ar-
guments have no bearing on the present case.31 Rather, in the present case, 
‘conservation’ meant conservation of the gene pool of the captive population, 
for the population’s sake qua captive, not qua potential re-introduction to the 
wild. Put that way, the question of ‘conservation’ in a captive setting seems 
question begging—for what purpose do we want to conserve a captive popula-
tion?
The objectives of zoos thus do not present sufficient reasons to override 
the moral responsibilities that are generated by the relationships that exist 
between zoo animals who are special and the viewing public. I want to argue 
then, that zoo officials owe zoo animals who they have displayed as special, in 
both life and death, a similar level of consideration and respect to that which 
we owe our companion animals, who are paradigm cases of non-human in-
dividual persons. What one would not do to one’s companion animal, one 
ought not do to a zoo animal whom we regard as special. Such a requirement 
would prohibit the culling of ‘surplus’ animals—and indeed the ceasing of the 
language of special animals as ‘surplus‘—or the use of their corpses for meat. It 
would also preclude using corpses for science or education, in all but the most 
respectful of manners.
More ambitiously, since zoos are deeply in need of compelling objectives 
for their continued existence, given the round critiques of their stated tradi-
tional objectives, perhaps they ought to take on the cultivation of interspecies 
relationships as more than a display practice: perhaps a new objective of zoos 
could be to facilitate friendship relationships between the species, teaching 
and instantiating the morality and compassion such relationships require. 
This idea has a somewhat Kantian flavor: rather than Kant’s idea that we 
ought to treat animals well not out of direct moral duty to them, but as prac-
tice for our moral relationships with humans, I am suggesting that we ought 
to treat zoo animals well, in part, as practice for our other moral relationships 
involving non-human animals.
It is unclear whether such an objective as ‘to foster compassionate indi-
vidual interspecies relationships’ or something similar can withstand moral 
31. Though the particular subspecies of reticulated giraffe that Marius was a member 
of is not presently endangered, its populations have been reduced by half over the last 
twenty years. However, since most re-introduction efforts fail, I do not think that ‘pre-
serving’ this sub-species in a zoo is the answer to that decline, for the reasons Jamieson 
mentions: generations of inbreeding and life in captivity lead, effectively, to a different 
animal than the one we were attempting to ‘preserve’ at generation one.
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scrutiny, however. Beginning from Jamieson’s starting point that a denial of 
liberty as such is prima facie morally objectionable, the question would be 
whether the fostering of interspecies relationships is an objective worth the 
overriding of an the animal’s prima facie right to liberty. This seems unlikely, 
and perhaps even self-undermining: how can we demonstrate compassion 
and a genuine concern for the welfare of animals by denying them their most 
basic right to liberty?
That said, we are of course left with the fact that zoos exist, are not go-
ing anywhere soon, and are now responsible for tens of thousands of inbred 
animals unable to survive in the wild, their survival skills atrophied by genera-
tions of captive breeding. For these particular animals, at the very least, it seems 
that the above reasoning stands: having enacted certain captive animals as 
special by displaying them as such, and thus encouraging meaningful, singu-
lar, relationships to be formed between these animals and their spectators, the 
zoo thus acquires the moral burden of maintaining—and not actively under-
mining—such relationships throughout the animal’s life and death.32
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